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ABSTRACT
The infectious diseases are spreading due to human interactions enabled by various social networks.
Therefore, when a new pathogen such as SARS-CoV-2 causes an outbreak, the non-pharmaceutical
isolation policies (e.g., social distancing) are the only possible response to disrupt its spreading. Since
there exist several non-pharmaceutical strategies to resort to, we need to assess their efficiency for
thwarting the pandemic impact. To this end, we introduce the new epidemic model (SICARS) and
compare the centralized (C), decentralized (D), and combined (C+D) social distancing strategies, and
analyze their efficiency to control the dynamics of COVID-19 on heterogeneous complex networks.
Our analysis shows that the centralized social distancing is necessary to minimize the pandemic
spreading. The decentralized policy is insufficient when used alone, but offers the best results
when combined with the centralized one. Indeed, the (C+D) policy is the most efficient isolation at
mitigating the network superspreaders and reducing the highest node degrees to less than 10% of
their initial values. Our results also indicate that a moderate social distancing, e.g., cutting 50% of
social ties, can reduce the outbreak impact by 47% for the C isolation, and by 31% for the D isolation.
A stronger social distancing, e.g., cutting 75% of social ties, can reduce the outbreak by 75% for the
C isolation, by 33% for the D isolation, and by 87% for the (C+D) isolation. Finally, we study the
impact of proactive versus reactive isolation strategies, as well as their delayed enforcement. We find
that the reactive response to the pandemic is less efficient, and delaying the adoption of isolation
measures by over one month (since the outbreak onset in a region) can have dangerous effects. Thus,
our study contributes to an understanding of the COVID-19 pandemic both in space (i.e., network-
centric analysis of isolation strategies), and time (i.e., delayed application of isolation strategies). We
believe our investigations have a high social relevance as they provide insights into understanding
how different degrees of social distancing can reduce the peak infection ratio substantially; this can
make the COVID-19 pandemic easier to understand and control over an extended period.
Keywords COVID-19 · epidemic model · social distancing · complex networks · isolation strategies
1 Introduction
The incidence of the new Coronavirus disease (COVID-19), caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus
2 (SARS-CoV-2), has seen an exponential rise since the end of 2019, affecting all continents as of March 2020 [1, 2].
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The number of cases reported to date is likely an underestimation, owing to the deficiencies in surveillance policy and
diagnostic capacity both in high and low-income regions [2]. Based on various scientifically relevant criteria, the WHO
has declared a global COVID-19 pandemic [1] in March 2020.
In the absence of an approved pharmaceutical treatment (or vaccine) and in-depth knowledge of the spreading
mechanism, the best strategies against COVID-19 consist of reducing the interactions between susceptible and infected
individuals, e.g., through early detection and social distancing [3]. Indeed, such non-pharmaceutical interventions
(NPIs) turned out to be very effective during previous pandemics [4, 5].
The potential effect of social distancing interventions on the COVID-19 has already been studied in Singapore [6].
Indeed, Singapore was among the first regions to report imported cases and has so far succeeded in preventing
community spread. However, the scale and severity of the Singapore interventions are small in comparison with the
measures implemented in China in response to COVID-19. The core Chinese interventions include shutting down
schools and workplaces, closing roads and transit systems, canceling public gatherings, and imposing a mandatory
quarantine on uninfected people (even those without known exposure to the virus) [7]. Although these actions seem to
be working so far, imposing similar restrictions in other countries represents an ongoing challenge. To convince people,
governments, and public authorities around the world that such extreme limitations are necessary, we need to back them
up with scientific evidence.
Given the dynamics of COVID-19 spreading, we can assess the efficiency of the control measures for this novel
pathogen by using mathematical modeling coupled with computer simulations of infectious spread under various
scenarios. To this end, we propose a new agent-based outbreak model called SICARS (Susceptible - Incubating -
Contagious - Aware - Removed | Susceptible), which allows us to assess the impact of the centralized and decentralized
isolation strategies on COVID-19 spreading across complex heterogenous networks. Consequently, we run simulations
of SICARS and test two fundamentally different strategies, as well as their combined effects:
1. Centralized (C) strategy, such as the government-imposed lockdown or quarantine; this means social distancing
by the synchronized removal of a specified ratio of node social ties from the entire social network.
2. Decentralized (D) strategy, such as aware-isolation (DA) and auto-isolation (DI); this means an individual-level
social distancing by asynchronously removing a specified ratio of personal social ties. More precisely, in DA,
the individuals who become aware of their sickness cut the social links in their ego-network. In contrast, in DI,
the healthy neighbors of sick individuals isolate themselves from the infected. In both scenarios, the social ties
are removed repeatedly (e.g., daily) based on a probability parameter.
3. Hybrid (C+D) strategy, whereby both policies are combined, hence the removal of the social ties involves both
centralized and individual-level decision mechanisms. To this end, a fraction of social links are synchronously
removed from all nodes in the network, then followed by repeated asynchronous distancing through self-aware
isolation of sick nodes (DA), as well as auto-isolation of healthy nodes from their sick neighbors (DI).
In contrast to other network approaches like [8, 9, 10], SICARS benefits from an additional state we introduce at
individual-level, which allows both synchronous and asynchronous isolation to be analyzed, as well as their delayed or
progressive application with an increase in severity of isolation. Our model is inspired by SIR [11], for which there exist
many variations including the SI, SIS, MSIR, SEIR, MSEIRS, SI1I2S, SI1|2S, and SI1SI2S models [12]. A modified
SEIR model was previously proposed for the Ebola outbreak of 2014 in Western Africa [13], consisting of the states
specific to Ebola: Susceptible - Exposed - Infected - Hospitalized - Buried | Recovered. In principle, the SEIR model
can be a candidate for capturing the states of an individual in contact with the COVID-19 outbreak. However, SEIR
lacks the Aware state we introduce in SICARS and which we exploit to study the decentralized isolation strategy. We
note that, while both Contagious and Aware are infectious states (i.e., the disease is transmitted), it is only when a node
becomes aware of being infected that it may isolate itself by applying social distancing. The contagious period during
which nodes are unaware of their infectiousness (and thus are unable to protect others) is one of the main characteristics
making the COVID-19 pandemic so dangerous and hard to control [3].
We note that there exist several studies based on compartmental models that present timely conclusions on understanding
the COVID-19 pandemic spreading. For instance, Koo et al. [14] adapt an existing influenza epidemic simulation
model (using data from Singapore) to assess the consequences of social distancing on the transmission dynamics. They
find that the intervention strategy combining quarantine, school closure, and workplace distancing seems to be the most
effective. Indeed, compared to the no interventions scenario, the combined intervention strategy reduces the estimated
number of infections in Singapore by 99.3%.
Kucharski et al. [15] merge a stochastic transmission model with data on coronavirus cases from Wuhan, China; they
estimate the early-stage dynamics of the epidemic and calculate the probability that new cases generate outbreaks in
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other areas. The main finding is that the median daily reproduction number Rt declined significantly, from 2.35 to 1.05,
after the introduction of travel restrictions in Wuhan, on Jan 23, 2020.
Prem et al. [16] use synthetic contact patterns, adapted to reduced social mixing, and employ SEIR to show that
the return to work in China should be further delayed (i.e., by one month). They state that the adoption of physical
distancing measures for a long time may reduce the number of infections by more than 92% by mid-2020.
Hellewell et al. [3] study a transmission model tailored to the COVID-19 outbreak and present several interesting
findings. First, if there would be no transmission likelihood before symptoms onset, the outbreak containment is
secure; unfortunately, this is not the case of COVID-19. Second, when the transmission onset or number of initial cases
increases, the controllability of the outbreak decreases significantly. Thus, based on the reproduction number Rt to
control the epidemic, 50% to 90% of contacts need to be traced and isolated. Third, the critical parameter affecting the
controllability of the epidemic is the delay between symptoms onset and start of isolation [3].
Ferretti et al. [17] warn that the current epidemic spread is too fast to be contained by manual contact tracing, and
suggest the use of digital tools, like smartphones, to accelerate the contact tracing. Indeed, social behavior plays a vital
role in the transmission dynamics of diseases [18, 19].
Finally, we note that the idea of social distancing, in various forms, is not new to network science and has been proposed
earlier for controlling epidemics [20]. Glass et al. [21] simulate an influenza model on a community representative
of a small town in the United States and show that social distancing would be necessary though school closures and
home isolation. For more infectious strains, they found that increased levels of quarantine are needed. Valdez et al.
[22] adopt an intermittent social distancing strategy to disturb the epidemic spreading process on different complex
network topologies. Specifically, a susceptible individual is allowed to interrupt the contact with an infected neighbor
based on a probability value. Using percolation theory, the authors find a critical threshold beyond which the epidemic
disappears. Reluga et al. [19] employ game theory to estimate the social behavior of individuals when adopting social
distancing during an outbreak. They find that the individual adopts a prophylactic behavior only after the epidemic
begins and ceases before the epidemic ends. Additionally, the reproduction number Rt must exceed a certain threshold
for individuals to feel that social distancing is worth the effort. In contrast, our work studies global, local, and hybrid
social distancing strategies to assess their effectiveness in controlling the COVID-19 dynamics.
Taken together, these related studies agree on the efficacy of a generalized quarantine and early detection with isolation
strategies. We improve the state-of-the-art with the following contributions:
• In contrast with the COVID-19 epidemic modeling proposed in [14, 15, 3], where isolation is modeled by
reducing the size of the susceptible compartment, our network-centric approach targets isolation strategies as
(local and global) edge removal mechanisms, hence an emergent and more realistic transmission dynamics.
• As the differential equations of SEIR do not apply to COVID-19, we use distributed simulation on well-known
complex topologies instead of the compartmental models based on random uniform contact networks that are
typically used to study epidemics spreading [23, 24, 12, 16, 15].
• Instead of focusing on assessing a specific isolation strategy (e.g., Singapore), our study aims at differentiating
the efficiency of centralized (global, government-imposed), decentralized (local, self-imposed), and hybrid
isolation while using the SARS-CoV-2 specific biological parameters.
• We focus on providing a more accurate quantification of the impact of different levels of social distancing, and
explore the realistic scenarios of delayed and progressive application of isolation, in the context of the current
pandemic.
2 Methods
2.1 Isolation strategies
We consider a complex interaction network represented as an undirected graph G = {N,E}, where N = {ni} is the
set of nodes and E = {eij |ni, nj ∈ N} is the set of edges. The nodes represent individuals in the society, while edges
represent the social interactions between individuals.
The edge removal ratio 0 ≤ e ≤ 1 quantifies the ratio of social ties removed from the network G. We define two
fundamentally different isolation strategies, based on the underlying principle of removing social ties, as follows:
Centralized (C): A ratio e of edges are randomly removed from all nodes ni ∈ N . This strategy is synchronous,
meaning that its application happens simultaneously across all network nodes during one simulation step (e.g., day);
this translates into a reduction of the number of network edges from |E| to (1− e)|E|.
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Decentralized (D): We consider this D strategy in two different variants, namely decentralized aware-isolation (DA)
and decentralized auto-isolation (DI). Both variants are asynchronous meaning that they are applied on a node-by-node
basis, based on a local decision mechanism. For DA, any node that is aware of being infected will self-isolate itself by
repeatedly removing e edges from its vicinity. For a high e, an infected node can rapidly become disconnected from the
network, thus impeding the pandemic outbreak. For DI, any healthy node that has an infected neighbor will remove the
corresponding social tie with a fixed probability of e. If e is small, the healthy node will likely need several simulation
iterations until successfully removing a specific social tie.
Hybrid (C+D): We also consider the response to a (C+D) isolation strategy by combining all three strategies C, DI,
and DA. More precisely, a centralized strategy is first applied on all nodes ni ∈ N , by randomly removing a proportion
of e edges from each node ni. Then, as on ongoing process, each node ni that becomes infected and aware will apply
self-isolation in its vicinity Ni, and each susceptible neighbor nj ∈ Ni will apply isolation from the sick node ni with
probability e.
Finally, given the global reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 and its social and economic long-term
implications, we notice a delayed enforcement of any isolation strategy in various places. Hence, we also analyze the
influence of the response delay (d = δDelay days) in applying any of the enumerated strategies.
2.2 SICARS epidemic model
We generalize the popular SIR epidemic model [25, 9] to explicitly enable the analysis of the isolation strategies that are
relevant to the COVID-19 outbreak. More precisely, our model defines five possible states for an individual: susceptible
S, incubating I , contagious C, aware A, and removed R, with the caveat that R is equivalent to either recovered or
dead; R can, under specific circumstances, relapse back to the susceptible state S (see Figure 1). We note that SICARS
is an edge removal model, rather than a node removal model. The reason behind this decision is that removing edges,
in the real context of a pandemic, can be controlled easier through isolation measures. In contrast, the removal of
nodes means total isolation, a measure that is impractical due to the massive amount of infected patients, and the social
consequences of such an extreme isolation.
We assume that, initially, s individuals act as the outbreak seed set Ns (initially marked as incubating), while the
susceptible individuals are the healthy inactive nodesN \Ns. Any susceptible node coming in contact with an incubating
node will not necessarily become infected. On average, only after δIncubation days, any incubating node automatically
becomes contagious, and susceptible nodes in the vicinity of a contagious node become infected with a probability
λInfect (see Figure 1). After some δAware days, the contagious nodes become aware (i.e., visibly symptomatic), and
their infectiousness becomes visible to the neighboring nodes. From this point on, after a total of δRemoval days, a node
will have transitioned from incubating (I), to aware (A), and finally to a removed R or susceptible S state again. A
removed node (either recovered or dead1) will not become susceptible again. At the end of the δRemoval recovery period
a node becomes dead with probability λDie, susceptible with probability λSusceptible, or recovered with probability
1− λDie − λSusceptible.
S I C A R
Susceptible Incubating Contagious Aware
Recovered
Dead
Removed
𝝀𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕
𝜹𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒖𝒃𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏
𝜹𝑨𝒘𝒂𝒓𝒆
𝝀𝑺𝒖𝒔𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚
𝟏 −𝝀𝑫𝒊𝒆 −𝝀𝑺𝒖𝒔𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚
𝝀𝑫𝒊𝒆
𝜹𝑹𝒆𝒎𝒐𝒗𝒂𝒍
Infectious
Figure 1: The states and parameters defining the SICARS model. By splitting the infectious stage into two sub-states,
contagious and aware, the model becomes unique in its capability of implementing centralized and decentralized
isolation strategies.
The SICARS pandemic simulation based on the model in Figure 1 is formally defined in algorithm 1. We further
illustrate how SICARS works in Figure 2, with a small example network of five connected nodes, which become
infected [3]. The outbreak seed is node A which needs a period of δIncubation days to become contagious. After
becoming contagious, node A spreads the disease to its neighbors B and C; these, in turn, become incubating after
1We assume merging these two states under the infected nodes gaining immunity assumption, which is likely, but not ultimately
confirmed yet in practice.
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Algorithm 1 SICARS model algorithm
1: assign randomly ns ∈ Ns ← I (incubating), where |Ns| = s
2: assign all other nodes ni ∈ N \Ns ← S (susceptible)
3: repeat . for each iteration day d
4: if d ≥ δDelay then
5: if using (C) strategy: remove any edge eij ∈ E with probability e
6: if using (DA) strategy: for ∀nk ∈ A (aware): remove any adjacent edge ekj ∈ E with probability e
7: if using (DI) strategy: for ∀nj ∈ S (susceptible), where nj ∈ Nk (neighborhood of an aware node nk):
remove edge ejk (incident to node nk) with probability e
8: if using (C+D): apply all corresponding steps (a-c) independently, in this order
9: end if
10: for ∀nk ∈ A (aware) for ≥ δRemoval iterations do
11: nk ← R(dead) with probability λDie
12: nk ← S(susceptible) with probability λSusceptible
13: nk ← R(removed) probability 1− λDie − λSusceptible
14: end for
15: for ∀ni ∈ C (contagious) do
16: for ∀nj ∈ S (susceptible), where nj ∈ Ni: nj ← I (incubating) with probability λInfect
17: if ni ∈ C for ≥ δAware iterations: ni ← A (aware)
18: end for
19: for ∀ni ∈ I (incubating) do
20: if ni ∈ I for ≥ δIncubation iterations: ni ← C (contagious)
21: end for
22: until (|I| = 0, |C| = 0, |A| = 0), or (|R| ≥ θN(e.g., θ = 95%))
several days of contact with A. Node A is still not aware that it became a disease carrier, nor that it has infected his
neighbors. After a delay of δAware days, node A becomes aware of its infectious condition (or state). At this point,
nodes B and C know that A is a threat, but are unaware if they have contacted the disease. In the same manner, nodes B
and C become contagious, then aware. Nodes D and E are further infected, and the process continues similarly. After
δRemoval days (measured individually for each infected node), every node changes to one of three states: recovered (B,
E), dead (C, D), or susceptible (A). The susceptible node A may start the same process all over again, going through all
the SICARS states.
A
B
C
D
E
Outbreak timeline
A Incubating Contagious Aware Susceptible
B
Node A is not aware that he is infected Node is aware of infection Node A recovers but remains susceptible
C
Incubating Contagious Aware Recovered
Incubating Contagious Aware Dead
Node is infected by node A Node recovers
Node is infected by node A Node dies
D Incubating Contagious Aware Dead
Node D is infected by node C Node dies
E Incubating Contagious Aware Recovered
Node E is infected by node C Node recovers
Contact network
Infected
Recovered
Dead
Contagious
Figure 2: Example of an outbreak process according to our SICARS model, when used over a hypothetical contact
network with five nodes (A–E), starting with infected node A. After an incubation period, node A becomes contagious
and may infect neighbors B and C at any time. Likewise, node C enters the incubation phase and then becomes
contagious for nodes D and E. Both contagious and aware states are infectious states, during which a node may spread
the disease. Only when a node becomes aware may isolation strategies be applied to it. Finally, all nodes evolve towards
one of two states: susceptible or removed (with the mutually exclusive sub-states recovered or dead).
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Furthermore, in Figure 3 we illustrate an intuitive example of applying each isolation strategy independently on a small
contact network of ten nodes. By setting e = 0.5, we show that the C isolation removes about 50% of edges in the
entire network, regardless of the node states (hence, all nodes are colored gray in Figure 3a); this process is applied
synchronously over the entire network. The DA and DI isolation, on the other hand, work asynchronously, and depend
on the (local) development of the disease in the vicinity of each node. In case of DA, pictured in Figure 3b, only
when a node becomes aware (orange) can it self-isolate by cutting edges in its vicinity (green nodes). In case of DI,
pictured in Figure 3c, a susceptible node (green) can only isolate itself from infected neighbors once these become
aware (orange), i.e., visibly infected. Finally, in case of the combined C+D strategy, we simply apply C followed by
DA and DI independently on the network.
Centralized isolation
Randomly removed edges
DA (auto-isolation of sick nodes)
A
DI (isolation of neighbors of sick nodes)
S
Infected aware node A
Vicinity of 
node A
Edges 
removed by 
node A
Susceptible neighbor S of 
aware nodes A1-3
A1
A2
A3 Edges 
removed by 
node S
a b c
Figure 3: Example of applying the C, DA, and DI isolation strategies over a small example contact network using an
edge removal ratio e = 0.5. (a) For C isolation, any edge will be removed with a 50% probability, regardless of the state
of any node. (b) For DA isolation, each node that becomes aware will cut all edges in its vicinity with a probability
given by e; in this example, node A removes 3 out of its 6 adjacent edges. (c) For DI isolation, each susceptible (healthy)
node which detects an aware (i.e., sick) neighbor, will try to detach from it with a given probability e; in this example,
node S manages to detach itself from sick nodes A2 and A3.
With our SICARS model, we start the diffusion process with s = 10 initial cases to represent the newly emerging
outbreak. The other parameters used in our model are gathered from the recent literature and summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Parameter values used with the outbreak model specific to the COVID-19 pandemic. For investigated we
experiment with multiple values for the respective parameters.
Parameter Empirical value Model parameter Value in model Reference
Incubation period 5.1-5.8 days δIncubation 5 days [26, 27, 28]
Delay from contact to onset 11.5-14 days δAware 12 days [26]
Delay from onset to recovery 2-8 weeks δRemoval 14 days [29, 30, 31]
Death rate 1-3% δDie 2% [30, 32]
Susceptibility rate < 1% δSusceptibility 1% assumed
Number of initial cases unknown s 10 [33], assumed
Infectious rate - δInfect 0.05 [9], assumed
Social tie removal rate - e 0–0.9 investigated
2.3 Test data description
Our simulations with the SICARS model use several synthetic network topologies and real-world network datasets,
i.e., a mesh network (Mesh), a Watts-Strogatz small-world network (SW ), and a scale-free network (SF ) [34]. It is
essential to analyze these basic topologies because they possess uniquely distinguishable network properties found
in nature [35, 36]. Note that the use of these topologies is not an attempt to replace the realistic contact networks,
but rather to validate the accuracy and the consistent dynamics of the SICARS model on several different types of
graphs. We also include several sizable real-world network datasets, which present a variety of heterogeneous social
interaction networks: the Enron email communication network (Em) [37], the Brightkite location-based social network
(Bk) [38], and the Epinions trust network (Ep) [39]. The reason for choosing these specific datasets is that from a
statistics standpoint, they hold characteristics representative for the contact network enabling epidemic spreading. In
particular, Em models relevant professional contacts and Ep models relevant friendship contacts. These connections
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are the most likely to be activated in the real-world social networks. Bk is also an appropriate choice because it models
a location-based mesh-like topology, which is a critical aspect of epidemics spreading [40].
In Table 2, we present the relevant network measurements for our enumerated test topologies. We include the network
size (the numbers of nodes N and edges E), average degree 〈k〉, maximum degree max(k), average path length APL,
average clustering coefficient ACC, network modularity Mod, and the network diameter Dmt [34].
Table 2: The relevant parameters of the synthetic and real-world test networks.
Network N E 〈k〉 max(k) APL ACC Mod Dmt
Mesh 5000 25234 5.047 36 13.942 0.185 0.855 37
SW 5000 19998 4.000 11 10.607 0.426 0.829 22
SF 5000 15762 3.152 294 5.378 0.007 0.640 13
Em 12625 20362 3.226 576 3.811 0.577 0.684 9
Bk 58228 214078 7.353 1134 7.371 0.271 0.667 18
Ep 75879 405739 10.694 3044 11.549 0.137 0.438 14
2.4 Analytical modeling of SICARS dynamics
To motivate the importance of simulating SICARS in the context of complex social interaction networks, we describe
the dynamics of the model by providing the differential equations that capture the time evolution of the number
of Susceptible, Infectious, and Removed individuals (S(t), I(t), and R(t), respectively). Although relevant for
the dynamics of the network topology (which evolves according to the adopted social distancing policies), the
number of Contagious and Aware individuals, C(t) and A(t), are simply a delayed version of I(t). Overall, we have
S(t) + I(t) + C(t) +A(t) +R(t) = N .
Another critical parameter that changes over time (as a function of the assumed social distancing policies) is the
network density ρ (t) = 2·nE(t)N(N−1) , where nE (t) is the number of edges in the network at moment t. Density ρ(t)
has a non-trivial evolution due to the heterogeneous structure of real-world networks, and due to the local decision
mechanisms implemented by isolation (i.e., DA, DI); thus, ρ(t) represents a dynamic parameter in our analytical
evaluation.
The equations system describing SICARS is as follows:
dS(t)
dt
= −ρ(t)λInfectS(t)(I(t) + C(t) +A(t)) + λSusceptibilityA(t)
dI(t)
dt
= ρ(t)λInfectS(t)(I(t) + C(t) +A(t))
C(t) =
∫ t
t−δIncubation I(τ)dτ
A(t) =
∫ t
t−δIncubation−δAware I(τ)dτ
dR(t)
dt
= (1− λSusceptibility)A(t)
(1)
with the initial conditions given by: 
S(0) = N − s
I(0) = s
C(t) = A(t) = R(t) = 0
(2)
The isolation strategies determine the dynamics of ρ(t), which, in turn, interact with the disease dynamics from the
equation system 1. In Figure 4a we present the centralized and decentralized evolution of the infection rate I(t)/N
according to the model described in equations 1 and 2, for an edge removal ratio of e = 0.5. After applying the C
isolation on the Em network (i.e., removing 50% of network edges), we measure a constant density ρ(t) = 0.0001. In
case of the D isolation, the density evolution is dynamic since edge removals are influenced by the spread of disease. We
thus obtain the evolution of density on the Em network, for e = 0− 0.75, as shown in Figure 4b; the density evolution
(for the same e = 0.5) is best described by a sigmoid function starting from from 0.00025 (point A) to 1 · 10−6 (point
B), namely ρ(t) = 0.00025
(
1− 11+e−0.3t+9
)
. The analytically determined evolution of the C and D strategies in
Figure 4a suggests that the peak infection ratio is higher and achieved sooner in the case of D (red line) compared to C
(blue line). Specifically, the infection ratio amplitude is 33% higher for D and occurs 32 days earlier than for C.
The asymptotic analysis of our model indicates that the centralized policy is more effective than the decentralized one.
However, using the network density (i.e., an aggregate parameter) does not realistically capture the dynamics of disease
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Figure 4: (a) Comparison between the C and D social isolation strategies for the analytical SICARS model with
equations 1 and 2. (b) Evolution of network density ρ(t) in time, on the Em network when applying the DA strategy,
as a function of the edge removal ratio (e).
spread, since the structure of real-world social interaction networks is not homogeneous but rather heterogeneous in
nature. Therefore, to test the interplay between the dynamics of SICARS and the dynamics of the network topology
according to the social distancing policies, we use detailed computer simulations as described next.
3 Results
3.1 How to control the epidemic dynamics?
We further analyze how to control the COVID-19 dynamics using social distancing. To this end, we run comprehensive
simulations of our SICARS model, for edge removal ratios e = {0, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.65, 0.75, 0.8, 0.9} on all test
networks in Table 2; we present next the results corresponding to the C, DA, DI, and C+D isolation strategies.
Varying the edge removal ratio e = 0 − 0.9 enables us to study a broad spectrum of the severity degree of social
distancing, i.e., from no distancing at all (e = 0), to mild (e = 0.1− 0.25), to moderate (e = 0.5− 0.65), all the way to
extreme (e ≥ 0.75) distancing. The effectiveness of these various forms of isolation is relevant to understand more
intuitively how exactly social distancing works in many regions of the world. For example, in the USA, a recent poll
by Gallup [41] shows that Americans are progressively increasing their social distancing strictness, from moderate
(e ≈ 0.5, mid-March 2020) to strict (e ≈ 0.75, end of March 2020). By the end of March 2020, 20% of polled
Americans admit to having no contact with people outside their house, and 44% of having minimal contact outside their
households. Similarly, the strict measures adopted by China [7] and Singapore [6] correspond to very strict measures
within the social distancing spectrum (e ≥ 0.8).
Centralized isolation: In Figure 5a, we depict the evolution of the infection ratio (r =
number of infected individuals/population size) during the simulation of the SICARS model for the C isola-
tion strategy, using the Bk network as a representative example. Here we measure a drop in the maximum amplitude of
the outbreak, from an infection rate of 62% to just below 4%, as the ratio of removed edges increases from e = 0 (i.e.,
no isolation at all) to e = 0.9 (i.e., severe isolation with 90% removed social ties); this means that, for e = 0.9, we get a
94% drop in outbreak severity. Additionally, we observe a delay of the maximum amplitude time, from d = 45 (point
A, for e = 0) to d = 116 (point B, for e = 0.9), meaning that the duration of the pandemic is prolonged by about 70
days. In Figure 5b, we display the drop in infection ratio, averaged over all the test networks in Table 2. These results
are consistent for all test networks, thus suggesting a significant linear drop in terms of outbreak impact (measured as
infection ratio r) when a strong centralized social isolation is applied (region B).
To reduce the infection ratio to 50% of the value corresponding to no isolation at all, we need to remove slightly more
than 50% of social ties. However, if the number of ties is reduced by 80% (e = 0.8), we observe a reduction of 82% in
the amplitude of the outbreak.
Decentralized isolation: We run simulations for both DA and DI on all test networks and find only marginal
differences between the two decentralized isolation strategies. Generally, DI follows the same trend as DA on all test
networks, but its effects are slightly delayed on time (OX axis) by 0-5%. Figure 6a depicts the evolution of the infected
ratio for the decentralized DA isolation strategy, using the Bk network as a representative example. By increasing the
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Figure 5: Efficiency of the centralized (C) isolation strategy in reducing the ratio of infected individuals. (a) The impact
of the edge removal ratio e in reducing and delaying the maximum outbreak amplitude. While no isolation (e = 0)
determines a maximum infection ratio of 62%, the isolation with e = 0.5 reduces the peak of the infection ratio to 33%,
and isolation with e = 0.8 reduces the peak of the infection ratio to just 11%, but also increases the outbreak duration
from roughly 100 days to 180 days. (b) The achieved outbreak amplitude with an increasing e, averaged over all test
networks in Table 2. We highlight the noticeable linear-concave response of the C strategy in region B (green).
edge removal ratio from e = 0 to e = 0.9, we observe a drop in the maximum amplitude of the outbreak from 62% to
35%; this translates into a drop of only 43% in outbreak severity. Additionally, we observe a slight acceleration of the
maximum amplitude time, from d = 46 (for e = 0) to d = 39 (for e = 0.9), meaning that the duration of the pandemic
is shortened by approximately 7 days. In Figure 6b, we display the drop in infection ratio averaged over all the test
networks. The results over the entire set of test networks suggest a moderate logarithmic drop in outbreak impact, even
for a strong decentralized isolation (region A).
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Figure 6: Efficiency of the decentralized (D) isolation in reducing the ratio of infected individuals. (a) The impact
of the edge removal ratio e in reducing and advancing the maximum outbreak amplitude. While no isolation (e = 0)
determines a maximum infection ratio of 62%, the isolation with e = 0.5 reduces the peak infection ratio to 41%, and
isolation with e = 0.8 reduces the peak infection ratio to 35%. The outbreak duration is not affected in a significant
way. (b) The achieved outbreak amplitude with increasing e, averaged over all test networks in Table 2. We highlight
the noticeable logarithmic-convex response of the D strategy in region A (green).
Reducing the number of social ties has an immediate impact, as a reduction of only 25% ties can reduce the impact of
the outbreak by 18%; however, further reducing the number of ties renders insignificant improvements. Our results
suggest that, by using a decentralized isolation strategy, it is not possible to reduce the infection ratio by 50% compared
to no isolation at all; the best we can achieve is a reduction of about 26%.
Combined C+D: In comparison to C or D isolation alone, the hybrid C+D gets the best of each strategy (Figure 7b).
We notice that the maximum infection amplitude has a linear-concave response when using the C isolation (Figure 5b),
and a logarithmic-convex response when using the D isolation (Figure 6b). This difference means that the effects of the
D isolation are seen immediately for small increases in e (region A in Figure 6b). In contrast, moderate to significant
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increases of e is needed to gain the benefit of C isolation (region B in Figure 5b). In this sense, the C+D strategy shows
the same convexity as D, but with a sustained linear reduction that is specific to C.
Figure 7a depicts the evolution of the infection ratio r for the combined C+D isolation strategy, using the same Bk
network as a representative example. By increasing the edge removal ratio from e = 0− 0.9, we observe a significant
drop in the maximum amplitude of the outbreak from 62% to just 5% (e = 0.8), respectively 2% (e = 0.9). Compared
to C and D isolation, with C+D we measure the highest efficiency in reducing the maximum infection ratio, by as much
as 87% (e = 0.75), and 98% (e = 0.9). Additionally, we observe a delay of the maximum amplitude time, from d = 45
(point A, for e = 0) to d = 70 (point B, for e = 0.8), meaning that the duration of the pandemic is prolonged by about
25 days (55%).
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Figure 7: Efficiency of the combined (C+D) isolation strategy in reducing the ratio of infected individuals. (a) The
Impact of the edge removal ratio e in reducing and delaying the maximum outbreak amplitude. While no isolation
(e = 0) determines a maximum infection ratio of 62%, the isolation with e = 0.5 reduces the peak of the infection ratio
significantly to 25%; isolation with e = 0.8 further reduces the peak infection ratio to just 5%. However, the outbreak
duration increases from roughly 100 days to 140 days. (b) The achieved outbreak amplitude with the increasing e,
averaged over all test networks in Table 2. Here, we notice both the initial logarithmic-convex signature of the D
strategy, as well as the final linear-concave signature of the C strategy combined.
For the hybrid C+D strategy, we need to remove just 25-50% of social ties in order to reduce the infection ratio to 50%,
compared to no isolation at all. Moreover, if we reduce the number of ties by 75%, we obtain a significant reduction of
87% in the outbreak amplitude (Figure 7b).
3.2 Why isolation strategies work?
After analyzing how to control the outbreak dynamics, we further try to explain why the presented isolation methods
work. To this end, we investigate a crucial property of network structure, namely the distribution of superspreaders
[42] before and after applying any of the discussed strategies. Indeed, many real-world networks possess a power-law
distribution of nodes degree, thus favoring the formation of hubs [43, 36]. These hubs have a significant accelerating
effect on the diffusion of innovation, ideas, as well as epidemics [9, 42, 44]; this is why these hubs are called
superspreaders. During an outbreak, it becomes paramount to reduce the connectivity of these superspreaders because a
single infected hub can exceed the combined adverse effects of many average or low connected nodes.
The simulation results in Figure 8a depict a representative evolution of the maximum degree reduction, by employing
the centralized and decentralized isolation strategies for e = 0.5. Based on their ability to mitigate superspreaders, we
notice a new signature for each strategy, which explains why they are more or less efficient at reducing the outbreak
impact. Specifically, the C strategy (red line) reduces the maximum degree to 50% of the initial network’s maximum
degree (i.e., given by e = 0.5) from the very beginning (d = 0) of the simulation. The DA and DI isolation strategies
(blue lines) have a delay of ≈ d = 36− 37 days until the network responds; after this moment, DI only reduces the
maximum degree to about 62%, while DA reduces it significantly, to only 3%. Finally, the hybrid C+D isolation carries
a signature that indicates the highest efficiency; namely, the reduction to 50% is obtained at d = 0, followed by a
reduction to 3%, similar to the DA strategy delay. The observations discussed for e = 0.5, in Figure 8a, are enforced in
Figure 8b, as we provide an extended overview of the maximum degree reduction for all tested edge removal ratios e.
Our experimental results support the idea that the DA and C+D strategies ensure that no superspreaders remain in the
network when applying an edge removal ratio e ≥ 0.5. For example, on the Bk network, the C+D strategy reduces the
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of maximum degree. (b) The effect of the edge removal ratio e on the reduction of maximum degree for each isolation
strategy.
maximum degree from k = 1134 to k = 34; on the SF network, the C+D strategy reduces the maximum degree from
k = 294 to k = 16, thus limiting the impact of hubs in the process of epidemic diffusion.
3.3 What may alter the course of the pandemic?
Reinfection impact: An additional parameter worth investigating for our epidemic model is the susceptibility rate
λSusceptibility , which is still uncertain for the SARS-CoV-2 virus at the end of March 2020. Throughout our simulations,
we consider a susceptibility rate of λSusceptibility = 0.01. However, we further explore the impact of isolation strategies
if the recovered patients prove to have a much higher chance of becoming reinfected (up to 10-50%).
Figure 9a shows that the pandemic dynamics is not significantly different at higher susceptibility rates. The moment of
the peak infection rate may be delayed by up to one week, while the amplitude of the infection ratio may increase by up
to 5%. Note that these results are based solely on the combination of COVID-19 specific parameters, and may not be
directly generalized to other past or future epidemic diseases.
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Figure 9: The effect of a higher patient relapse rate (s = 1− 50%) in terms of infection ratio. (a) The effect of different
relapse rates when using the C isolation strategy. A higher relapse rate of s = 50% increases the infection ratio by
5% and delays it by 7 days. (b) The effect of different isolation strategies when using a relapse rate of s = 50%. The
combined logarithmic-convex and linear-concave of the (C+D) hybrid strategy (yellow) explains its higher effectiveness.
In Figure 9b, we focus on a single relapse rate of s = 50% to show the impact of each isolation strategy; the response
of all isolation strategies is the same regardless of the relapse rate. The higher efficiency of the C+D isolation is again
underlined in panel 9b. This set of experiments indicates that even a high patient relapse rate would not alter the
effectiveness of the isolation strategies significantly.
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Delaying isolation restrictions: While the WHO praised China’s quick and aggressive response [7], other countries,
such as the UK or USA, have delayed their responses. We analyze next the efficiency of all isolation strategies in the
context of a delayed implementation of quarantines/lockdowns. To this end, we compare three scenarios when the same
strategies are applied with a delay of d = {0, 20, 30, 50} days after the initial outbreak.
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Figure 10: Effects of delaying the application of isolation strategies, relative to the start of the outbreak, measured as
the maximum infection ratio in the network. (a) Detailed comparison on the outbreak amplitude obtained for delays
of d = {0, 20, 30, 50} days, with e = 0.5 and e = 0.75. For e = 0.5, a delay of d = 20 days increases the maximum
infection ratio by 8%; a delay of d = 30 increases the ratio by 24%; a delay of d = 50 increases the maximum ratio
by 76%. (b) Overview of the delays’ impact on the maximum infection ratio with increasing values of e. The smaller
negative impact of the shorter delay (d = 20, orange line) is distinguishable from the impact of the longer delay (d = 50,
green line).
The simulation results in Figure 10a suggest that governments/authorities should take an immediate action to enforce
the isolation strategies. In general, for moderate isolation (e = 0.5), the outbreak amplitude increases significantly with
the delay (Figure 10a); thus, for a delay of d = 20 days (yellow line) we observe a +8% higher infection ratio, for
d = 30 days (green line) we observe a +24% higher infection ratio , and for d = 50 (blue line) the results are alarming
with +76% more infections than the immediate response (red line). A more severe isolation (e = 0.75) further amplifies
the effects of the delaying isolation strategies, compared to the moderate isolation. As such, for the same delays, we
measure increases in the infection ratio of +41% (yellow dotted line), 3.4× (green dotted line), respectively 3.88×
higher (blue dotted line) compared to an immediate response (red dotted line). Figure 10b presents an overview of
each delay impact on the maximum infection ratio for the entire range of tested edge removal ratios e = 0− 0.9. The
difference between the shorter delay of d = 20 days (orange line) and the long delay of d = 50 days (green line) is
noticeable.
Proactive vs. reactive isolation: Complementary to a delayed application of isolation restrictions discussed in the
previous section, we also investigate the feasibility of a reactive policy that is being used by some authorities around
the world. In other words, some governments are reacting to the accelerated outbreak spread by adopting increasingly
more severe quarantine measures as time goes by. In contrast to the proactive isolation (meaning that a fixed e is
imposed from a specific moment in time), we model the reactive policy by progressively increasing the strength of
isolation, from e = 0 to e = 0.8, at fixed moments in time. As such, we analyze two realistic scenarios for adopting a
progressive policy. First, the edge removal ratio is increased as a delayed reaction to the pandemic spreading, with
values e = {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8}, applied at moments r1 = {10, 20, 40, 60} (faster reaction). Second, the reaction
happens at moments r2 = {20, 40, 60, 80} (slower reaction). This means that, for example, during the first 20 days of
the r2 progressive policy, we have no isolation at all (i.e., e = 0); after day d = 20, e is increased to e = 0.2, and so on.
In Figure 11a we compare the reactive policies r1 and r2 with roughly equivalent proactive C strategies. In this sense,
we find that the r1 policies has an equivalent effect in reducing the impact of the outbreak, as the C isolation with
e = 0.65 (point B). Additionally, the r2 policies is similar to C isolation with e = 0.25 (point A). In other words, if a
government reacts slowly, by progressive increases of isolation severity (e.g., policy r2) up to e = 0.8, the result will be
the same as if the government would have applied a more relaxed C isolation with e = 0.25 from the very beginning of
the outbreak.
In the case of the combined C+D strategy, the impact of the progressive isolation is less effective than in the centralized
context. To that end, Figure 11b shows that policy r1 is roughly similar to C+D isolation (proactive) applied with
e = 0.5 (point B), respectively policy r2 is similar to C+D isolation with e = 0.1 (point A). This means that, even
12
A PREPRINT - APRIL 13, 2020
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0 50 100 150
In
fe
c
ti
o
n
 r
a
ti
o
 [
r]
Simulation days [d]
e=0.25 (C)
e=0.65 (C)
r=10 (C)
r=20 (C)
a b
Isolation plans(A)
(B)
47%
26% 57%
23%
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0 50 100 150
In
fe
c
ti
o
n
 r
a
ti
o
 [
r]
Simulation days [d]
e=0.1 (C+D)
e=0.5 (C+D)
r=10 (C+D)
r=20 (C+D)
Isolation plans(A)
(B)
51%
29% 53%
18%
r1 (C)
r2 (C)
r1 (C+D)
r2 (C+D)
Figure 11: Comparison between proactive and reactive responses in applying isolation measured as the maximum
achieved infection ratio. (a) C isolation strategies (proactive) with e = 0.25 (mild isolation) and e = 0.65 (stricter
isolation) are equivalent to reactive policies r2 (slower reaction, every 20 days) and r1 (faster reaction, every 10 days),
respectively. (b) C+D isolation (proactive) with e = 0.1 (very mild isolation) and e = 0.5 (moderate isolation) are
equivalent to reactive policies r2 and r1, respectively. The arrows pointing down suggest the reduction in infection ratio
compared to the case of no isolation.
though r2 eventually reaches a very strict isolation of e = 0.8 (after 80 days), it is not more effective than a very mild
C+D isolation with e = 0.1.
3.4 The impact of isolation strategies on small-scale communities
While real contact networks have been studied before in the context of epidemic spreading [45, 46, 47], their corre-
sponding topologies are representative only for small-scale communities, or specific micro-environments (e.g., schools,
stadiums, airports, hospitals). However, we cannot directly extrapolate the topological characteristics of such contact
networks at the level of a metropolis, region, or country, which we are facing in the case of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Nevertheless, we use two real contact networks to study the impact of the same isolation strategies. We include the
Lyon school network (LS) with N = 242 nodes [46], and a US high school network (US) with N = 788 nodes [45].
Both networks have been constructed using proximity data (in the range of 1-3m) gathered from sensors worn by school
staff and students.
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Figure 12: The impact of the edge removal ratio e in reducing and delaying the maximum outbreak infection ratio
r, by applying a combined (C+D) isolation strategy on two micro-scale contact networks: Lyon school (a) and US
high school (b). On both networks, mild to moderate isolation (e = 0− 0.5) has no effect in limiting the infectious
spreading (points A); only more severe isolation (e > 0.75) manages to reduce the peak of the infection ratio, but only
by 4-14% (e = 0.9; points B). The outbreak duration lengthens by roughly 14 days by increasing e.
We find that for such small communities the effect of all isolation strategies is less obvious. The most significant
reduction in infection ratio r is achieved, again, by the hybrid (C+D) strategy, which we depict in Figure 12a (LS
network), and Figure 12b (US network). On both networks, the mild to moderate isolation (e = 0− 0.5) plays almost
no role in reducing the infectious spreading (points A), with r ≈ 100%. A reduction of the peak infection ratio is only
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visible for the severe isolation (e > 0.65); in case of the maximum isolation with e = 0.9, the infection ratio drops by
14% (LS) and 4% (US) (point B). In contrast, the infection reduction on the large scale test networks, for the same
isolation strategy, is 98%, compared to no isolation at all, similar to Singapore [14]. Furthermore, the outbreak duration
on contact networks LS and US is lengthened by about 14 days when increasing the edge removal ratio from e = 0 to
e = 0.9.
4 Discussion
According to our SICARS epidemic model, we find that a trade-of exists between the the COVID-19 outbreak duration
and infection rate. Specifically, applying forms of moderate to strict quarantine can prolong the pandemic duration by
roughly +40% (Hybrid C+D) and +80% (C) days, compared no isolation at all, where we estimate the duration of the
pandemic at ≈ 100 days. Indeed, while a more extended quarantine may have complex economic consequences, the
invaluable benefit of applying isolation strategies is the significant reduction of the peak infection ratio, and implicitly a
reduction of casualties.
The overall difference between the C (centralized), D (decentralized), and hybrid (C+D) isolation strategies is summa-
rized in Figure 13. Panel 13a highlights the reduced efficiency of the DA and DI isolation when removing 50% of social
ties. Compared to the no isolation case, DA and DI manage to reduce the infection amplitude by only 39%. In contrast,
the efficiency of the C isolation grows roughly linearly with e, while the hybrid C+D isolation yields the best results
(71% infection reduction). A more strict restriction might be necessary for COVID-19, meaning a reduction of up to
75% social ties, as depicted in panel 13b. In this case, the efficiency of the C isolation remains proportional to e (75%),
while the combined C+D isolation offers the most significant infection amplitude reduction of 87%. Our experimental
results suggest that by further restricting the quarantine to e = 0.9, we can achieve a 98% reduction in outbreak impact,
comparable to the 99.3% results obtained on the Singapore population [14].
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Figure 13: Efficiency of isolation strategies, in terms of the relative infection ratio reduction, compared to the baseline
case of no isolation (given as percentage next to each corresponding isolation strategy) when the isolation strategy
removes 50% of social ties from the network (moderate isolation) (a), 75% of social ties (severe isolation) (b).
By analyzing different parameters which characterize the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, we find that:
• While an early response to adopting isolation strategies is critical, we find that a delay of d = 20− 30 days
has a significant negative impact (+8-25% more infected). Higher delay values of d = 50 days would have a
catastrophic negative impact (+76%, compared to no delay).
• While the real patient relapse rate is not yet fully known (i.e., currently is estimated at < 1%), we find that a
higher relapse rate (e.g., 10%) would not significantly alter the effectiveness of the isolation strategies, neither
in terms of infection amplitude, nor maximum duration.
• From a network structure standpoint, the C isolation strategy mitigates the superspreaders by immediately
reducing the maximum degree in the network (i.e., proportionally to e.) The D isolation also reduces the
maximum degree significantly (as low as < 10%), but only after a delay of d = 36− 37 days.
• A reactive isolation policy which implies step-wise delayed increases of e, is less effective than a proactive
policy with a specific e imposed from the outbreak onset. In other words, to match the proactive policy, a
reactive policy would have to use a far more severe social distancing (e) over time.
As a comparison between proactive (or early) and reactive (or delayed) measures applied in real-world settings, we
exemplify the cases of China, Singapore, or South Korea [7, 6] for the former type of response, respectively the UK
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[48] or USA [41] for the latter. Indeed, the proactive policy confirms its significant effectiveness, as both the number of
infected cases and deaths are already declining in the Asian countries mentioned above. In contrast, current estimations
of the COVID-19 progress in Western countries are less optimistic.
There are several limitations to our analysis. On the one hand, based on current evidence, we use biological parameters
that characterize the SARS-CoV-2 virus that are not fully confirmed in practice. For instance, we have explored the
unknown susceptibility rate (relapse probability) and found that its effects on our conclusions are not major; however,
one may update these values as more comprehensive data surfaces. On the other hand, the entire contact networks of
large regions around the world affected by COVID-19 (e.g., China, Europe, or the USA) are impossible to reconstruct
entirely due to their size, dynamics, and lack of individual-level information. Similar to other approaches [9, 10, 49],
we base our study on several synthetic and real-world datasets as reliable proxies of the contact network of individuals.
By fitting the SICARS model to multiple complex network topologies, we aim at making the best possible assessments
on the SARS-CoV-2 transmission dynamics.
Also, our study on the impact of isolation strategies extended to micro-scale contact networks shows several interesting
insights. First, due to the small scale and high connectivity of these contact networks, the isolation strategies have
little efficiency in defending against the COVID-19 spreading. We believe that the specific duration from contact to
symptom onset, characterizing the SARS-CoV-2 virus, renders any measures almost useless in such small communities.
The maximum possible reduction of infection ratio of 4-14% is obtained only for the most severe isolation (e = 0.9).
Second, we observe a lengthening of the outbreak duration (by 14 days), similar to the one visible on the large scale
test networks. Third, we conclude that the topologies of contact networks are representative only for micro-scale
communities (e.g., the Diamond Princess cruise ship quarantined in Japan, or the Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier
docked in Guam), and may not be directly extrapolated at the level of large cities, regions, or countries, as is the case of
the COVID-19 pandemic.
Of note, our observations come in support of a recent scandal in the U.S. navy involving the decision to remove infected
military personnel from an aircraft carrier. Indeed, due to the high density of the contact network aboard, and the
limited physical space making social distancing almost impossible, our results suggest that the captain took the right
decision. Indeed, without such measures the SARS-CoV-2 virus spreading would have been super fast and may have
likely achieved an infection ratio of up to 100% in no time.
Summarizing our simulation results, the main conclusions of this study are:
• The decentralized (D) isolation strategy helps2, but is insufficient on its own. In other words, the decentralized
methods are not effective in mitigating the impact of the superspreaders (i.e., nodes with a high connectivity,
therefore a high contagious potential) in a timely manner; hence, their potential for reducing the dynamics of
pandemics like COVID-19 is limited.
• The centralized (C) isolation strategy is a must, as it is more efficient than the decentralized approaches.
• The best response strategy is a hybrid one (C+D). If used too late after the outbreak of the pandemic, even the
combined C+D strategy loses its effectiveness significantly.
• All isolation strategies applied proactively (at outbreak onset) are more effective than applied reactively (in
response to the epidemic dynamics) even by progressively increasing the isolation severity.
• A higher patient relapse rate than currently estimated for COVID-19 would not alter our conclusions on the
effectiveness of the isolation strategies significantly.
With COVID-19 having reached the status of a global pandemic, understanding the effectiveness of social distancing
measures in various settings is crucial for apprehending the dynamics of the outbreak and being able to contain or
mitigate it adequately.
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